Wireless Carriers&rsquo; Exclusive Handset Arrangements: An Empirical
Look at the iPhone by K. Chintagunta, Pradeep et al.
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org 
 
 
 
Working Paper #11-35 
 
October 2011 
 
Wireless Carriers’ Exclusive Handset Arrangements: An Empirical Look at the 
iPhone 
 
Pradeep K. Chintagunta      Hongju Liu       Ting Zhu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) 
Institute, http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on 
network industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual 
networks” comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating 
system, and on network issues in general. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wireless Carriers’ Exclusive Handset Arrangements: An Empirical Look at the 
iPhone2 
 
 
Ting Zhu 
Hongju Liu 
Pradeep K. Chintagunta 
 
 
Revised: October 2011 
Preliminary and incomplete 
   
                                                 
2 The authors thank the seminar participants at the London Business School and the University of British 
Columbia for comments and suggestions. This research was funded in part by the Initiative on Global 
Markets at the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business. Financial support from the Kilts Center in 
Marketing and the NET Institute is gratefully acknowledged. 
3 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Since the Apple iPhone’s first launch in 2007 with an exclusive arrangement with 
AT&T, it has garnered overwhelmingly positive responses from consumers and from the 
media. With its success, exclusive contracts between handset makers and wireless 
carriers have come under increasing scrutiny by regulators and lawmakers. Such practices 
have been criticized by regulators, by the media, and by “locked-out” consumers, due to 
the fact that a consumer has to subscribe to a particular service provider if he or she 
strongly prefers one handset to others. In this paper, we empirically examine the impact 
of handset exclusivity arrangements on consumer welfare. First we study consumers’ 
purchase decisions in mobile services that include the choice of a handset and of a service 
provider. We do so by combining survey data on consumers’ purchase decisions with 
supplemented data on prices and features of common handsets. Next, assuming a 
Stackelberg leader-follower relationship between the handset manufacturers and the 
service providers, and using our demand estimates, we recover the marginal costs for the 
players in the market. We then simulate what would have happened in the counterfactual 
scenario when the iPhone is available from all carriers. Our results suggest that, if we 
take into account price adjustments from handset manufacturers and service providers in 
response to the change in market structure, consumer welfare will increase by $326 
million without the exclusive arrangement. We view our analysis as a starting point to a 
more complete characterization of consumer behavior and the complex relationships 
among players in this industry. 
 
Keywords: Exclusive Arrangement, Distribution Channels, Wireless Service 
JEL codes: L13, L25, L42, L96
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1. Introduction 
 
The Apple iPhone was launched in 2007 under an exclusive distribution agreement 
with AT&T. Apple and AT&T activated two million units of the device in six months 
after its launch (Kharif and Burrows 2008).  Due to the overwhelming success of the 
iPhone, exclusive contracts between handset makers and wireless carriers have drawn 
increasing scrutiny from lawmakers and regulators. For example, the Senate Commerce 
Committee held a hearing in 2009 on the subject of competition in the wireless industry, 
and urged the FCC to investigate whether such exclusive contracts are harming 
consumers by precluding consumers’ handset access.3 Further, the legal literature has 
seen a big debate on whether Carterfone type regulations that were enacted by the FCC 
in 1968 should also be brought to bear on the wireless market (see e.g. Ford et al. 2008, 
Hoeker 2008, Hahn and Singer 2009). These regulations forced “the separation of the 
sales of wireline telephone service from equipment and provided consumers the freedom 
to attach non-harmful third-party devices to the telephone network” (Hoeker 2008).4 
Exclusive agreements typically allow a wireless carrier to serve as the sole 
distributor of a particular handset for a given period of time. Because most consumers in 
the U.S. purchase handsets in a bundle with a two-year service contract from a wireless 
carrier, the availability of handsets can significantly influence consumers’ choice of 
wireless carriers.5 Thus wireless carriers can use an exclusive handset as a competitive 
differentiator to attract more consumers (Subramanian et al. 2008). For example, in the 
first quarter of 2009, 23% of the new AT&T subscribers signed up for “a phone not 
offered by my carrier” (i.e., for the iPhone), and the company has reported that 40% of its 
iPhone customers switched from other services.6 
                                                 
3 “FCC to Review Exclusive Deals that Lock up Hot Cellphones,” by Amy Schatz, Wall Street Journal, 
June 19, 2009, page B3. 
4 This regulation is viewed by many as a watershed event that eventually led to the breakup of AT&T. 
5 According to Global Wireless Matrix 2007Q4, a study conducted by Merrill Lynch, the wireless 
penetration rate in the U.S was 84.4%, including 16.1% prepaid customers and the rest on long term 
contracts. In our data 70% of consumers chose a two-year service contract. 
6 “Is Handset Exclusivity Really the Wireless Issue of the Day?” by Roger Entner, Nielsen Wire, August 27, 
2009. 
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Large wireless carriers such as Verizon and AT&T, who are more likely to benefit 
from these exclusive deals, have opposed any efforts to stop the practice. They argue that 
the deals encourage innovation and competition among handset manufacturers. However, 
smaller carriers such as U.S. Cellular7 and consumer groups such as Rural Cellular 
Association8 have complained about such deals, arguing that an exclusive arrangement 
hurts competition and prevents residents of rural areas from getting access to the latest 
technologies.  
Scholars and researchers have offered a diverse range of views on the regulation of 
exclusive arrangements. For instance, Baker (2007) criticized exclusive arrangements 
since they limit options for consumers and diminish the ability of smaller carriers to 
compete. Exclusive deals deprive some consumers of either their desired handsets, or 
their desired carriers, or both. On the other hand, Hahn and Singer (2009) suggested that 
the practice encourages carriers to share the risk of launching a new handset; aligns the 
incentives of carriers with handset makers to provide high-quality services; and drives 
innovations by handset makers as they are able to share the costs of innovating with the 
service providers. Therefore exclusive arrangements can promote consumer welfare, and 
should be applauded by the government. 
Despite the importance of understanding the welfare consequences of such exclusive 
deals, empirical evidence on these types of arrangements has been lacking. Specifically, 
while legal scholars have weighed in on both sides of the “Carterfone for wireless” 
debate, their arguments have been based largely on either what happened as a 
consequence of Carterfone or how the characteristics of the wireless market are different 
from those of the wired telephone market in the 1960s. Further, some authors (see Ford et 
al. 2008, Hermalin and Katz 2010) have written out analytical models of the 
consequences of exclusive arrangements. For example, Ford et al. (2008) show that 
handset prices would rise and service prices would remain unchanged if Carterfone type 
regulations are instituted for the wireless market. This seems to indicate that consumers 
will be worse off due to regulatory intervention. 
                                                 
7 See the written statement of Mr. John E. Rooney, President and CEO, U.S. Cellular Corporation, before 
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, June 17, 2009. 
8 See Rural Cellular Association’s “Petition for Rulemaking Regarding Exclusivity Arrangements between 
Commercial Wireless Carriers and Handset Manufacturers” before the Federal Communications 
Commission. 
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Our objective in this paper is to empirically measure the impact of handset 
exclusivity arrangements on consumer welfare. Achieving this objective however, is a 
challenging task for a variety of reasons. In order to measure the welfare impact we need 
an appropriately specified consumer demand model that reflects the complexities of the 
cellphone handset-service marketplace. Further, we need to appropriately characterize 
how prices could change under the counterfactual of no-exclusivity. For this we need to 
specify the objectives of the various players in the market and the nature of interactions 
among them. Specifying the consumer demand model is complicated by the following: 
(a) the durable nature of the handset; (b) the large number of handset options available to 
subscribers; (c) the largely contractual nature of the relationship between the service 
provider and the customer; (d) variation across geographic markets of the service quality 
of various service providers. Further, in order to appropriately capture the potentially rich 
substitution patterns among handset and service providers, it would be preferable to have 
subscriber-level handset purchase and subscription data.  
Turning now to the supply side of the analysis, we note that the nature of the 
relationships, contracts and agreements among the handset manufacturers and the service 
providers are largely unobserved and the nature of transfer payments to the handset 
providers is unknown to us. Consequently, on both demand and supply sides we will need 
to make several simplifying assumptions that we describe next. Thus our study needs to 
be construed, at best, as a first step in understanding an otherwise complex problem. At 
the same time, we need a first step given the paucity of empirical research in this area. 
For demand estimation, we use Forrester Research’s Consumer Technographics 
survey data from 2007 and 2008. The survey data contain consumers’ demographic 
information, as well as their wireless service providers and their handset characteristics. 
Since our data include consumers who did not have wireless service in 2007 but did so in 
2008, we are able to account for possible category expansion. For those who had wireless 
service in 2007, we model the purchase decisions of potential consumers only, i.e., those 
that are at the end of their contract period and are therefore “in the market” for wireless 
services in 2008. We construct consumers’ choice sets by collecting the prices and 
features of the common handsets from Consumer Reports. Further, we collect data on the 
service quality of the different service providers in the different geographic markets. 
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Together, these aspects of our data deal with the ability to identify substitution patterns, 
variations in service availability across markets and accounting for the contractual nature 
of the customer – service provider relationship.  
A challenge associated with our empirical task is how to handle the large number of 
choice alternatives. Because we define each choice alternative as a bundle of a handset 
and a service contract from a wireless carrier, the number of possible alternatives is even 
larger. To make the choice set manageable, we collect information on the common 
handset models from Consumer Reports, and aggregate over all other models. Note that if 
two handset models share very similar attributes, we treat them as the same alternative. In 
the end consumers’ choice sets are constructed to include 88 different alternatives. 
Using the above panel dataset assembled for the purpose, we first estimate a random 
coefficient logit model of consumer demand for wireless services that accounts for 
consumers’ choices of both carriers and handsets. This demand function ignores the 
various dynamic aspects associated with the durable nature of the handset and service 
provision, i.e., we do not account for consumers’ forward-looking expectations regarding, 
e.g., the availability and prices of handsets from providers, service quality (via the 
installation of more cellphone towers), etc. Our justification for this simplification is that 
consumers treat the plan-handset decision as a “repeat” purchase made every 2 years. In 
2009, 150 million handsets were sold to 270 million subscribers – an approximately 1:2 
ratio. While there could be several reasons for this (e.g., a subset of customers own 
multiple handsets), it is also consistent with the 2-year purchase cycle. Clearly, this does 
not preclude consumers’ forward-looking expectations regarding aspects of the plan-
handset bundle, but it does make this category appear different from standard durable 
goods products such as automobiles and could potentially make it amenable to be 
approximated by myopic behavior.9 We learn about the demand function for wireless 
services from the observed sales and price information for different handsets and service 
providers. We are particularly interested in consumers’ intrinsic preferences for different 
handsets and service providers. Given the demand function, we can infer the substitution 
patterns between handsets and across service providers. 
                                                 
9 Even in those markets, researchers have often assumed myopic consumers (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes 1995, Petrin 2002, Sudhir 2001, etc.). 
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Next, we model the handset pricing decisions of handset makers and wireless carriers 
as a Stackelberg leader-follower game, in which the handset manufacturers set wholesale 
prices first and the service providers then set prices for the handsets to the subscribers. A 
handset maker can charge different wholesale prices for the same handset model to 
different service providers. We then calculate the margins for handset manufacturers and 
for the wireless carriers on each handset. Here again, we ignore possible dynamic 
considerations on the supply side, the presence of long-term contracts between handset 
manufacturers and service providers, etc.  
Based on estimates for consumers’ demand and firms’ margins, we conduct 
counterfactual experiments to examine the welfare consequences of the exclusive 
contract between Apple and AT&T vis-à-vis the iPhone. In particular we simulate what 
would have happened if the exclusive arrangement did not exist and hence the iPhone 
was available from all carriers. As a baseline for comparison, we first assume no 
competitive responses from other service providers and cell phone makers. Holding all 
prices constant, we find an annual welfare gain of $210 million in the U.S. market. Next, 
since we would expect firms to set different wholesale and retail prices for handsets in 
the counterfactual market environment, we need to take into account the competitive 
responses in the market. After incorporating possible price adjustments according to our 
supply-side model, the annual welfare gain becomes $326 million in the U.S. market. 
An important question regarding our analysis is: how sensitive are our results to the 
assumptions we make on the demand and supply sides in terms of the dynamics and the 
nature of interactions between the various firms in the market. To accurately assess this 
we will need to, of course, explicitly relax these assumptions.10 An alternative would be 
to examine the degree to which key quantities of interest are likely to be incorrectly 
estimated by e.g., ignoring demand-side dynamics. For example, key factors that drive 
our counterfactual analysis are the estimates of preferences and price elasticities. We find 
that our price elasticity estimates for the iPhone are comparable to the estimates obtained 
by other economists who have detailed information on iPhone’s profit margins. This 
gives us some assurance as to the validity of our estimates. 
                                                 
10 We are in the process of trying to relax some of the assumptions vis-à-vis the demand model. As noted 
previously, this is a challenging task for several reasons. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the role 
of exclusive arrangement in the U.S. wireless market. Literature and data are described in 
section 3 and 4 respectively. We specify the demand model in Section 5. After a 
discussion of the estimation results in Section 6, we present the counterfactual analysis 
and the welfare consequences of the exclusive arrangement on iPhone in Section 7. We 
conclude in Section 8.  
 
2. The U.S. Wireless Market 
 
Revenues in the U.S. wireless industry reached $145 billion in 2008 after annual 
increases of over 10 percent since 2003. The number of users was estimated to have 
exceeded 270 million cellular phone subscribers in the U.S. by the beginning of 200911 
and was the fastest growing sector among telecommunication services. The strong growth 
was attributed to improvements in the quality of wireless service and increases in the 
range of available features such as video content, e-mail and text messaging capabilities, 
and wireless Internet. Players in the wireless industry include device manufacturers (e.g. 
Nokia, Blackberry, Apple), wireless carriers (e.g. AT&T, Verizon), broadband 
infrastructure companies (e.g. ClearWire, Qualcomm, Siemens, Ericsson), and 
application developers.  
Wireless Service Providers 
The wireless service market in the U.S. appears to be highly concentrated. In 2008, 
the four leading wireless service providers – AT&T, Verizon Wireless, Sprint Nextel and 
T-Mobile USA (owned by German-based Deutsche Telekom) – accounted for 
approximately 80 percent of the U.S. market (with the concentration ratio steadily 
increasing from 61% in 2003). Other wireless service providers include Alltel (now part 
of Verizon), U.S. Cellular and several more rural players. Notwithstanding these 
numbers, Merrill Lynch reports that in 2009, the concentration in the U.S. was the second 
lowest among the 26 countries under examination (Global Wireless Matrix 2Q09). And 
according to the 13th Commercial Mobile Radio Services Competition Report (FCC 
2009), over 95% of the U.S. population lives in census blocks where there are 3 or more 
                                                 
11 “Wireless, Cellular & RFID Industry Trends” by Plunkett Research, LTD. 
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wireless service providers. Given this scenario, service providers compete on several 
dimensions – coverage (including factors such as dropped calls), plan attributes (price, 
rollover minutes, free calling to other subscribers of the same provider), customer service 
quality, and quality of handsets. Service providers are aggressively working to attract 
new customers and to maintain current ones by improving coverage and service quality, 
fine tuning plan attributes to provide innovative services, and offering the latest handsets 
to their customers. 
Wireless Phones 
Demand for wireless phones in the U.S. increased 12 percent annually during 2003-
2008 and reached 150 million units in 2008. It benefited from an increasing number of 
wireless service subscribers and decreasing wireless phone prices. In addition, continuous 
introductions of wireless phones with better design and more features had a strong 
influence on demand (FCC 2009). 
Wireless phones were initially limited to one primary function – voice 
communication. Over time, manufacturers have added more and more features such as 
cameras, MP3 players and GPS systems. The introduction of “smartphones” was a major 
innovation in the wireless industry (Ford et al. 2008, Hahn and Singer 2009). 
Smartphones are cell phones that have many features of a desktop computer and are 
connected to the Internet. In addition to allowing people to make and receive calls and to 
check e-mails, smartphones run complete operating system software thereby providing a 
platform for application developers to write software for these platforms. 
Although smartphones have been around for more than a decade12, substantial 
growth only started in recent years. While early entrants included Nokia, Palm, 
BlackBerry, etc., that were popular with corporate customers, the launch of the iPhone 
was the most notable event in the consumer segment. Introduced in 2007, the iPhone 
accounted for a 10.8% share of the worldwide smartphone market by Q1 2009 with a 
total of 21 million units sold till January of that year. Because AT&T was the sole 
distributor of iPhone under an exclusive deal, such exclusivity agreements have become a 
contentious issue (IDG news, 2009). 
                                                 
12 An early example of a smartphone was the IBM Simon introduced in 1993. It was hailed as “the first 
time a company had placed a computer in a cellular phone” (Mobile Phone News, November 8, 1993). 
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Handset Exclusivity 
The four principal wireless carriers have been, over the years, able to tie up the most 
advanced, attractive handsets through exclusive arrangements. The negotiated handset 
exclusivity period is often several years or for the entire lifetime of the device. Handset 
technologies and features advance rapidly. According to Rooney (2009), the average 
lifecycle of handsets is twelve months after initial launch. As a result, even an exclusive 
period of six months can impact the sales of that handset through other carriers greatly. 
While exclusivity was not always the norm, many of the recent iconic handsets were 
introduced under exclusive contracts. For example, The Sidekick was a T-Mobile 
exclusive in 2002; Motorola’s Razr V3 was exclusively offered by AT&T in 2004; the 
Blackberry Pearl was introduced in 2006 through T-Mobile only; Verizon was the 
exclusive distributor of the BlackBerry Storm; AT&T was the exclusive distributor for 
the Blackberry Curve; and Sprint was the exclusive distributor of the Palm Pre. What is 
notable in this list is that the same handset provider (e.g. Blackberry) offers exclusive 
handsets to different service providers. 
Although exclusive deals have been criticized by smaller rivals and consumer 
groups, the major carriers claim that such exclusive deals enable them to take risks on 
expensive new smartphones and bring them to market at discounted prices, hence leading 
to more choices and lower prices for consumers.13 So AT&T paid Apple $300 per 8GB 
iPhone 3G; Verizon paid Blackberry about $200 per Storm; and Sprint paid Palm 
approximately $340 per unit of the Palm Pre. Exclusive deals restrict handset 
manufacturers such as Palm, RIM and Apple from distributing their devices widely (i.e., 
by being exclusive to AT&T, Apple only has access to about 30% of the U.S. market), 
but analysts point out that those companies benefit by getting a significant share of 
carriers’ marketing and sales resources.14 For example, AT&T’s annual reports state that 
for the fiscal year 2007, increased sales and marketing costs of $572 million, were 
attributable to the iPhone. 
 
3. Literature 
                                                 
13 “Cellphone Politics,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2009, page A14. 
14 “Telecoms Face Antitrust Threat,” by Amol Sharma, Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2009, page A1. 
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The Wireless Industry 
Despite the wireless industry having changed dramatically since the 1990s, the 
nature of the cellular phone market has not yet been explored in much detail. One 
research stream examines the penetration of mobile services (e.g. Hausman 1999). Some 
other studies analyze the market structure and competition between wireless service 
providers. For example, Iimi (2005) analyzes the demand for wireless services using data 
on the Japanese market in late 1990s, and finds that the service providers are highly 
differentiated. Bajari et al. (2008) studies the importance of national coverage to 
consumers’ choices of service providers. Another stream of research investigates how 
users choose service plans under different pricing regimes (Lambrecht et al. 2007).  
Past studies have focused on consumers’ choice of service providers, without taking 
into account their handset choices. To our knowledge, there are two exceptions. Jain et al. 
(1999) develops an analytical model to examine consumer subscription decisions based 
on prices of both cellular phones and service plans. In their framework the handset is 
assumed to be a homogenous product across service providers. By contrast we model 
consumers’ purchase decisions in combinations of differentiated handsets and service 
providers. The second exception is the study by Aribarg and Foutz (2009). They use a 
conjoint choice experiment to investigate consumers’ decision process when they 
purchase a product bundle of a handset and a service plan. In our paper, we use real 
purchase data to identify consumers’ preferences for handsets and carriers without 
imposing any structure on their decision processes.  
Vertical Restraints 
An exclusive contract requires a handset model to be sold by certain service 
providers. Such restrictions are referred to as vertical constraints by industrial 
organization economists. There is a large literature on the economic impact of such 
constraints (see e.g. Lafontaine and Slade 2005). Theoretical work has investigated the 
justification for and the consequences of exclusive contracts. In some cases such 
constraints can reduce economic welfare, whereas in other cases they may increase 
economic welfare. In particular, Subramanian et al. (2008) examines when and why a 
cellular service provider and a handset manufacturer may decide to enter an exclusive 
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contract. Their model suggests that the exclusive contract raises the rival service 
provider’s handset costs by reducing the competition faced by a rival handset 
manufacturer. A service provider’s benefit from an exclusive contract increases with the 
degree of service differentiation. 
A number of empirical papers on channel structure also relate to this study (e.g. 
Besanko et al. 2003, Chen et al. 2007, Chu et al. 2007, Villas-Boas 2007). In particular 
Asker (2005) evaluates the effect of exclusive arrangement on competition in the Chicago 
beer market. Brenkers and Verboven (2006) study the competitive effects of liberalizing 
the selective and exclusive distribution system in the European automobile market. For 
our counterfactual analysis, our pricing model follows this stream of research and 
especially Asker (2005), Chen et al. (2007) and Villas-Boas (2007). 
 
4. Data Description 
 
In this paper we study consumers’ purchase decisions in mobile handsets and service 
providers. We use Forrester Research’s Consumer Technographics survey data collected 
in early 2008 and 2009. The data reflect purchase information in 2007 and 2008 
respectively. The survey goes out to about 60,000 consumers in the U.S. and Canada each 
year with some overlap in respondents across years. There are 10,546 consumers in the 
U.S. who participated in both 2008 and 2009. Among them we identify 7526 consumers 
who made a purchase decision in 2008, while others continued with the second year of 
their two-year contract. We have detailed information on household demographics, their 
attitudes towards technology, their mobile service providers, and characteristics of their 
handsets.15 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize consumers’ subscription decisions in 2007 and 2008. In 
Table 1, we compare the market share of leading handset manufacturers. It shows that the 
market share for smartphone brands such as Apple and BlackBerry increased in 2008. 
However, regular wireless phones still dominated the market. Table 2 describes 
consumers’ switching patterns across service providers. The two leading carriers, AT&T 
                                                 
15 Other studies have looked at the representativeness of such a panel derived from repeated cross-sections 
of overlapping data (e.g., Liu et al. 2010). 
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and Verizon, accounted for almost 50% of the market in 2008. The table also shows s 
strong state dependence in choice of service providers. For example, 1378 out of 1669 
AT&T users in 2007 chose to stay with AT&T in 2008. Note that these customers were at 
the end of their two-year contracts and could, in principle, have switched providers. 
Similar patterns can also be found for other service providers. Verizon has the lowest 
churn rate (15%), and is followed by AT&T at 17%. Both Sprint and T-Mobile have 
higher churn rate at about 30%. The data are consistent with the monthly churn rates 
reported by Merrill Lynch – 1.3%, 1.6%, 2.3% and 2.7% for Verizon, AT&T, Sprint and 
T-Mobile respectively (Global Wireless Matrix 2Q09).  
Given consumers’ brand switching behavior; we look for indications of any “iPhone 
effect” on consumer purchasing decisions including the choices of handsets and carriers. 
In Table 2, we observe that both AT&T and Verizon had more service subscribers in 
2008 than in 2007, whereas AT&T attracted more new subscribers than Verizon. We 
further look into the handset choices by AT&T subscribers. Table 3 indicates that 
compared to existing AT&T subscribers, those who switched from Verizon were more 
likely to purchase the iPhone. This seems to suggest that some Verizon customers 
switched to AT&T for the iPhone. If a consumer preferred Verizon but had to switch 
because iPhone was only available through AT&T, this would constitute a welfare loss 
caused by the exclusivity arrangements on iPhone. This observation also motivates the 
need to allow for heterogeneity in handset preferences for any service provider as well as 
heterogeneity in provider preferences for any given handset – a feature that we 
incorporate into our model. 
To supplement our data, we obtain prices and features of the common handsets  from 
Consumer Reports and CNET.com. The carriers subsidized the handsets if they were 
purchased with a two-year contract. For example, AT&T paid Apple $300 for an iPhone 
3G (with 8GB storage), leaving AT&T customers the balance of $199. Verizon paid RIM 
roughly $200 toward the $399 total price of the BlackBerry Storm, leaving its customers 
the balance of $199. Even lower-end phones can draw substantial subsidies from carriers. 
On the other hand, not everyone needs the sophisticated capabilities offered by a 
smartphone. The market is still dominated by regular cell phones. A regular cell phone is 
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usually priced less than $50 and often free with a two-year contract. Figure 1 describes 
the distribution of handset prices to the end consumers.  
The prices for carriers’ service plans are collected from carriers’ websites. For the 
same carrier, the service plans are essentially the same throughout the country. Therefore 
we assume that consumers in the U.S. face the same set of prices for wireless services, 
although the service quality varies across different areas for different service providers. 
To control for the effects of carriers’ signal quality on consumers’ choices, we collect 
data from an online website, www.signalmap.com, which records the signal strength for 
major wireless carriers reported by consumers throughout the country. The signal 
strength is reported in a scale from 1 to 5. We calculate the average signal strength for 
each carrier in different designated market areas (DMAs), and then match the DMA 
information with the Forrester survey data on where respondents live. Table 4 shows the 
average signal strength for the four major carriers across markets. AT&T and Verizon 
appear to provide stronger signals at lower variation across markets than Sprint and T-
Mobile. 
To illustrate the effect of signal quality on consumer choices, we compare 
consumers’ subscription decisions across DMAs. In Table 5-1, we summarize 
consumers’ carrier choice in markets where AT&T offers superior signals, i.e., AT&T’s 
average signal strength ≥ 3, whereas Verizon’s average signal strength ≤ 2. We find that 
AT&T had a higher market share in these markets, and attracted more customers in 2008. 
On the other hand, in Table 5-2 we summarize consumers’ carrier choices in markets 
where AT&T offers inferior signals, i.e., AT&T’s average signal strength ≤ 2, whereas 
Verizon’s average signal strength ≥ 3. We observe a higher market share and more 
recruits for Verizon in these markets. 
 
5. The Model 
 
We consider a market with competing service providers and their compatible 
handsets. We assume that consumers choose service providers and handsets 
simultaneously, and thus each choice alternative is a bundle of a handset and a two-year 
contract with a service provider. We assume that a smartphone purchase is always 
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coupled with a corresponding data plan. The outside option consists of no purchase as 
well as the wireless service plans without a long term contract such as the prepaid plans.16 
Consumer Utility Specification 
The indirect utility function is defined over a handset and service plan bundle. If 
choosing handset j and service provider k  at time t, a consumer i obtains a utility of 
,ijkt ijkt ijktU V    
Where the deterministic component of utility is given by; 
   , 1 , 1' ;H H S Sijkt jkt i ik i jkt i jkt H i t j S i t jktV x p p I b b I s k                 (1) 
j
j = 1,2,...,J;
k = 1,2,...,K . 
J  is the total number of handsets, including both smartphones and regular phones; and 
jK  is the number of service providers that carry handset j . xjkt is a vector of handset 
characteristics, including the handset brand and indicator variables for regular phone, 
smartphone, touch screen, GPS, etc. The intrinsic preference for service provider k  is 
represented by αik, which is assumed to vary across consumers. Hjktp  is the handset price 
and Sjktp  is the monthly service fee. We allow the price coefficient to be different across 
the two prices, because consumers are likely to treat the one-shot handset price and the 
monthly service price differently.17 Note that if handset j is a smartphone, then Sjktp  
includes the monthly fee for the basic service as well as that for the data plan.  
We use two indicator functions to control for potential state dependence in consumer 
choices of both handsets and service providers. I{bi,t-1=bj} is an indicator function that 
equals to one if handset j has the same brand as consumer i’s previous handset and zero 
otherwise. Similarly I{si,t-1=k} equals one if consumer i chose k as the service provider in 
                                                 
16 Potentially we are able to estimate a model with two separate outside goods – a prepaid plan and no 
wireless service. Given the limited information about the prepaid plans in the data, we choose to combine 
these two options as one alternative in the choice set. 
17 Alternatively we can estimate a single price coefficient, but add up the handset price and the discounted 
flow of monthly service fees, with the discount factor to be estimated as well. In other words,
24t
H H S S H t S
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
     . These two alternative treatments are equivalent up to a scaling 
factor and so none of the other parameter estimates will change. 
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the last period. ξjkt represents other characteristics that are unobservable to the researcher 
but observed by consumers. Finally εijkt is a random error that follows a type 1 extreme 
value distribution.  
We use a random coefficients logit model to allow for more flexible substitution 
patterns across choice alternatives. In particular, we allow certain parameters to vary 
across consumers according to 
 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4[ , , , , ] ' , , , ,
smart smart
i i i i i i iTech v               . 
γsmart represents a consumer’s preference toward smartphones, and α represents her 
preference toward wireless service providers with subscripts 1-4 indicating AT&T, 
Sprint, T-Mobile and Verizon respectively. The variable Techi represents whether 
consumer i likes technology or not, as indicated in her responses to the Forrester survey.  
To allow for correlations between consumer preferences for smartphones and for service 
providers, we assume that vi follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero 
and with the following covariance matrix: 
11 12 13 14 15
12 22
13 33
14 44
15 55
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
    
 
 
 
 
        
. 
To reduce the number of parameters to be estimated we assume zero correlations between 
the preferences for different service providers. 
The model identification heavily relies on the variation in prices and other 
characteristics of handsets. The brand preferences for different service providers are 
identified by the relative market share of the same handset across carriers. Similarly, the 
brand preferences for handsets are identified by the relative share of the different brands 
within a carrier after controlling for prices and product characteristics. State dependence 
can be identified from the extent of switching in the data; and the effects of signal quality 
off of variation across geographic markets. 
Estimation Issues 
In the utility specification for a handset and service plan bundle in Equation (1), the 
handset prices can be correlated with the unobserved product characteristics, such as 
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stylishness of design. If the resulting endogeneity is not controlled for our parameter 
estimates will be biased. Therefore we use the control function approach proposed by 
Petrin and Train (2009) to address this issue. In the first stage we recover the unobserved 
attributes as a control factor by regressing handset prices on a set of observed exogenous 
variables and instrumental variables. Then in the second stage we estimate the demand 
parameters while using the recovered control factor as an extra variable.  
Specifically in the first stage we recover ξjkt*, a one-to-one mapping of ξjkt, through 
the following regression: 
   *Hjkt jkt jktp z   . 
zjkt includes dummy variables for service providers and handset brands, exogenous 
handset characteristics, and a set of instrumental variables. Similar to Albuquerque and 
Bronnenberg (2010), Petrin and Train (2009) and Iimi (2005), we use the following 
instruments: (1) the mean value of each exogenous characteristics across all other 
handsets of the same brand sold by the same service provider; (2) the mean value of each 
exogenous characteristics across all handsets of the same brand sold by other service 
providers; and (3) the mean value of each exogenous characteristics across all handsets of 
other brands sold by the same service provider. 
The mean value of an observed attribute from rival products is used as an instrument 
since it can be interpreted as the average attractiveness of rival products, which has an 
impact on the pricing of the focal product. On the other hand such mean value of one 
attribute is unlikely to be correlated with a firm’ decisions on whether to include a 
different product attribute. Thus we believe these instruments are correlated with handset 
prices but not with the unobserved attributes. 
Likelihood Function 
Using the obtained ξjkt* as a covariate in place of ξjkt in equation (1), the estimation 
of demand parameters can proceed via maximizing the following likelihood function: 
  P ( , , , ) .ijktyijkt i i i
i k j
L x p v f v dv   
Pijkt represents the probability that consumer i chooses handset j from carrier k at time t, 
and yijkt is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if that happens..  
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Because the second stage maximum likelihood estimation uses an estimated ξjkt* 
from the first stage, the standard error of the second stage estimator has to be adjusted 
accordingly following Petrin and Train (2009). 
Pricing Model 
In order to conduct counterfactual experiments to examine the welfare consequences 
of the exclusive contract between Apple and AT&T vis-à-vis the iPhone, we need to 
simulate what would have happened if the exclusive arrangement did not exist and hence 
the iPhone was available from all carriers. We first model the handset pricing decisions 
of handset makers and wireless carriers as a Stackelberg leader-follower game, in which 
the handset manufacturers set wholesale prices first and the service providers then set 
retail prices for the handsets to the subscribers. We then recover the margins for handset 
manufacturers and service providers, which will be used for our counterfactual analysis. 
We start from a scenario in which only handset (retail and wholesale) prices are 
decision variables given service prices. The carrier maximizes its total profits by 
choosing the optimal retail prices for handsets given monthly service fees.  
    
( )
max ,
Hp kjk
H S H
k jk jk jk jk
j J
p w r s p

    
 
where kJ is the set of product sold by service provider k , jkw is the wholesale price for 
product j , Sjkr  is the margin that the carrier receives on monthly service fees, and  jks p  
is the share of product-service bundle jk . The first order conditions with respect to the 
handset prices, assuming a pure strategy Nash-equilibrium in prices, are 
   0
k
H S mk
jk mk mk mk H
m J jk
ss p w r
p
        . (2) 
Each handset manufacturer maximizes its profit by choosing the wholesale prices for 
its handsets, knowing how service providers set retail prices according to Equation (2). 
The manufacturer’s profit function is  
  
w
w jk jk jk
j M k
w c s

   , 
where Mw is the set of handsets produced by manufacturer w. The first order conditions 
can be written as 
20 
 
   0
w
jk
jk jk jk
j M k jk
s
s w c
w
    . (3) 
As in Villas-Boas (2007), we obtain the following vector expression for service 
providers’ implied price-cost margins and manufacturers’ wholesale price-cost margins 
respectively: 
    1*H S Hr rp w r T s p     , 
   1* Hw ww c T s p    . 
wT  is a ownership matrix for manufacturers, and rT  is a ownership matrix for service 
providers. In particular, element (i, j) in Tw equals to one if a manufacturer sells both 
products i and j, and zero otherwise. Similarly, element (i, j) in Tr equals to one if the 
service provider sells both products i and j, and zero otherwise. r  represents how 
demand responds to changes in retail prices of handsets, with element (i, j) defined as
i
H
j
s
p

 . w  describes how demand responds to changes in wholesale prices of handsets, 
with element (i, j) defined as i
j
s
w

 .
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Note that the above two equations allow us to calculate the wholesale margins and 
retail margins. Because we do not have direct observations on any of c, w or rS, we are 
not able to identify them separately. However, such separation is not critical for the 
purpose of predicting retail prices – shifting c, w and rS by a constant while preserving 
the margins will lead to the same retail prices. Therefore it is sufficient to recover the 
wholesale and retail margins in order to perform our counterfactual analysis. 
 
6. Results 
 
We report the estimation results from three alternative models: (1) a logit model with 
no control for price endogeneity; (2) a logit model with control for price endogeneity; and 
(3) the proposed random coefficients logit model. 
                                                 
18 The details on the calculation of these matrices are provided by Villas-Boas (2007). 
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For comparison, results for models (1) and (2) are both reported in Table 6. We can 
see that after controlling for price endogeneity, consumers appear to be more sensitive to 
handset prices. Estimation results for model (3) are provided in Table 7. First, brand 
intercepts for top handset brands and for major service providers are reported. The values 
of these intercepts reflect the relative attractiveness of different brands, after accounting 
for other effects in the model. We find that Apple and BlackBerry enjoyed the highest 
preferences among all handset makers, which is consistent with the popularity of the 
iPhone and BlackBerry handsets. Among the major wireless carriers, Verizon and AT&T 
appear to be more attractive than Sprint and T-Mobile on average. 
Table 7 also shows that the parameters of most product features are of the expected 
sign and significant. Having features such as touch screen and GPS positively affect the 
consumers’ mean utility for a handset. Smartphone and Contract are defined as dummy 
variables indicating a smartphone and a two-year contract respectively. It is interesting to 
observe that the parameter estimate for the contract subscriptions is negative. Intuitively, 
a consumer does not prefer to be locked in a two year contract, hence a service provider 
generally provides price discount for handset to attract potential service subscribers.  
Smartphone is more attractive than regular phone after controlling for prices and product 
characteristics. From the interaction effect of technology attitude and smartphone, we 
find that consumers who are more technology proficient are more likely to subscribe to a 
smartphone service. Naturally, a stronger signal increases the utility of wireless service. 
Next, we turn to the effects of prices on consumers’ purchase decisions. In equation 
(1), we allow the price effects to be individual specific. During empirical estimation, we 
make these price effects specific to different income levels. The results suggest that 
lower-income individuals are more price sensitive than higher-income ones. According to 
the price coefficients, consumers are more sensitive to the monthly service price than the 
handset price, which is not surprising given that consumers have to sign a two-year 
contract and pay the monthly service fee for 24 months.   
Now we calculate the average price elasticity of demand for handsets. For each 
household, we calculate price elasticity as the expected percentage change in the 
purchase probability of a handset relative to one percentage change in the handset price. 
We find that the average price elasticity for handset is -1.77 across all smartphones. The 
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price elasticity of iPhone is relatively high with the magnitude of -3.46.19 For the handset 
with price equals to zero, we calculate the semi price elasticity. For example, if price of 
the free handset increase to 10 dollars, then the market share will decrease 15.6% on 
average. 
We find strong state dependence in consumers’ choices of handset brands and 
service providers, which suggests a strong tendency for consumers to stay with their 
current handset brands and with their current service providers. In terms of the 
magnitude, the state dependence effect in service provider is much larger than that in 
handset brand, possibly due to more competition in the handset market. 
From the estimates for the covariance matrix for vi, we observe that there is less 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences for service providers than for smartphones. In 
addition, we find significant positive preference correlation between smartphones and 
Verizon. 
From the supply side model, we can solve for the retail margins for service providers 
and the wholesale margins for handset manufacturers. We then calculate the average 
margins across all handset-carrier combinations. On average, a carrier’s margin is 9.3% 
and a handset manufacturer’s margin is 5.8% of the total revenue including monthly 
service fees from a two-year contract and handset retail prices.  
 
7. Counterfactual Analysis 
 
Our research objective is to measure the impact of iPhone’s exclusive arrangement 
on consumer welfare. This objective requires us to conduct a counterfactual analysis to 
find out what would have happened if iPhone were not under the exclusive arrangement 
and hence available to other wireless carriers as well. We examine two scenarios: (1) 
iPhone were available to Verizon in addition to AT&T; and (2) iPhone were available to 
all wireless carriers.  
First we assume away any competitive responses and hold all retail prices constant in 
the market. For other carriers who could also offer iPhone in a counterfactual scenario, 
                                                 
19 Scott Cunningham from CoreEconomics used a different approach to calculate elasticity of demand for 
the iPhone, and found an elasticity of -3.37 for the iPhone. 
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we assume the same retail price of $199 on the iPhone. The predicted market shares are 
reported in Table 8. If both AT&T and Verizon carried iPhone, Apple’s market share 
would have been 2.25%, 0.9% higher than the observed 1.35% under the exclusive 
arrangement. If all carriers could offer iPhone, Apple’s market share would have further 
increased to 3.48%.  
To evaluate the welfare loss resulted from the exclusive arrangement between Apple 
and AT&T, we calculate the compensating variation as a measure of welfare change 
following Small and Rosen (1981). Based on the estimates of our demand model, the 
average welfare loss from one consumer due to the exclusive contract is $1.08 for each 
purchase occasion. Given there were 300 million potential wireless subscribers and 70% 
subscribed for a two-year contract in the U.S. by the beginning of 2009, the aggregate 
welfare loss is estimated to be $210 million per year, which accounts for 0.14% of the 
$145 billion revenues in the U.S. wireless industry in 2008. 
In the analysis above, we hold all retail prices constant and focus on the welfare loss 
due to the absence of valuable choice alternatives. However, in a counterfactual market 
environment we would expect firms to adjust their prices in response to the different 
channel structure. Therefore it is important to model the strategic interactions between 
firms and to account for competitive responses. We assume that handset makers and 
wireless carriers follow a Stackelberg leader-follower pricing game, in which handset 
makers set wholesale prices first, whereas wireless carriers set retail prices accordingly. 
To make the model tractable we assume that wireless carriers would have kept the 
current monthly service fees while adjusting handset prices in these counterfactual 
situations. The proposed model follows Villas-Boas (2007), Chen et al. (2007), Chu et al. 
(2007) and Asker (2005). By assuming a Stackelberg leader-follower game between 
handset manufacturers and wireless carriers, we are able to back out the marginal costs 
for various handsets and then use these cost numbers to predict the retail prices in 
counterfactual market environments.  
We first predict the retail prices of the iPhone from different carriers if it became 
available from both AT&T and Verizon.20 The predicted prices and market share are 
                                                 
20 Since we do not have the marginal costs of iPhone from other carriers, we assume that their marginal 
costs are the same as AT&T’s, which has been recovered from the supply side model.   
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reported in the second and third column of Table 9. In the fourth column, we report the 
predicted prices of iPhone if it became available from all carriers. We find a small change 
in AT&T’s subsidized price of iPhone. The price from Verizon would have been slightly 
higher, but the smaller carriers would have offered much lower prices. We also find that 
under the new channel structure, AT&T would have lowered its prices slightly for other 
handsets21 while its competitors would have increased prices for other handsets. The 
intuition is that AT&T would have lost its relative advantage on product selection if 
iPhone were available from other carriers, and thus might have cut prices on other 
handsets to stay competitive. By contrast, with the iPhone other carriers might have been 
less aggressive in their pricing of other handsets. Based on the predicted prices, we 
calculate market shares and welfare consequences. The market share for the iPhone 
would have been 4.59%, higher than the 3.48% without accounting for price adjustments. 
The annual welfare loss is estimated to be $326 million, again higher than the previous 
estimate primarily due to lower prices from smaller carriers.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we study the welfare consequences of the exclusive arrangement 
between Apple and AT&T on iPhone. First we estimate consumer demand for wireless 
services including their choices in both handsets and wireless service providers. Our 
approach provides a framework to investigate the complex problem of understanding 
consumers’ joint purchases in these closely related product categories. We then model the 
pricing decisions of handset makers and wireless carriers, in order to predict how they 
would have adjusted their prices in the counterfactual scenario that iPhone were not 
subject to an exclusive contract and thus available to all wireless carriers. Our results 
suggest that the annual welfare loss resulted from the exclusivity agreement observed on 
iPhone is about $326 million, from which $210 million resulted from restricting 
consumers’ choice set, and the rest due to firms’ price adjustments.   
Several limitations of our study leave opportunity for future research. First, when 
iPhone was first launched some consumers might decide to postpone their purchases in 
                                                 
21 The price drops $0.41 on average.  
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expectation of a lower price or more apps for iPhone in the future. In this study, we do 
not incorporate consumers’ forward-looking behavior. 
Second, we examine the welfare loss to consumers due to the fact that exclusive 
arrangements restrict consumer choices. However, major wireless carriers argue that 
exclusive arrangements allow risk sharing between handset makers and wireless carriers, 
and hence encourage innovations. This could induce long-term welfare gains to 
consumers. In this study we abstract away from this aspect of the welfare consequences, 
and focus on the direct welfare loss due to exclusivity. It may be fruitful for future studies 
to take a more complete view and examine the long-term effect by taking into account 
innovations. 
Finally, our counterfactual analysis is dependent on several assumptions on the 
supply-side model. Because we do not have detailed information on production costs of 
handsets and service costs incurred by service providers, we have to make assumptions 
on the pricing game played between firms, and rely on the structure of our supply-side 
model to identify the marginal profits for each player in the game. Again we ignore 
possible dynamic considerations on the supply side. Given better information on firms’ 
cost structure, we could relax some of the relatively strong assumptions we have to rely 
on. 
In summary, our study is the first step to empirically analyze the issue of exclusive 
arrangements. We estimate the direct welfare loss resulted from the exclusivity 
agreement between Apple and AT&T on iPhone, and seek to provide empirical evidence 
for policy makers. There are several limitations in our study, which we believe to be 
important and worthwhile for future research to investigate.  
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Table 1: Summary of Consumer Handset Purchase Decisions 
 
Brand 2007 (%) 2008 (%)
Carrier's brand 8.57 7.63
Apple 0.35 1.33
BlackBerry 1.69 3.89
HTC 0 0.34
Kyocera 2.34 1.96
LG 14.17 18.66
Motorola 26.13 23.51
Nokia 14.35 11.86
Palm 0.93 0.90
Samsung 12.03 13.43
Sanyo 2.57 1.81
Sony Ericsson 1.87 1.86
Others 2.35 2.26
No Phone 12.68 10.56
 
Note: Based on the survey responses from 10546 consumers. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Consumer Service Subscription Decisions 
 
 None AT&T Sprint T-Mobile Verizon Others Total (2007) 
None 901 103 18 39 72 204 1337 
AT&T 54 1378 25 27 84 101 1669 
Sprint 14 46 362 16 57 43 538 
T-Mobile 15 38 11 363 49 33 509 
Verizon 29 90 32 32 1425 67 1675 
Others 101 227 72 50 143 1205 1789 
Total (2008) 1114 1882 520 527 1830 1653 7526 
 
Note: The numbers in each row represent the number of subscribers in 2007. The numbers in each column 
represent the number of subscribers in 2008. 
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Table 3: Handset Choices by AT&T Service Subscribers in 2008 
 
Brand All Subscribers Subscribers from Verizon 
Apple 5.7% 12.2% 
BlackBerry 6.2 10.0 
HTC 0.4 3.3 
LG 12.2 10.0 
Motorola 16.2 11.1 
Nokia 18.4 17.8 
Palm 0.7 1.1 
Samsung 14.8 10.0 
Sanyo 0.5 1.1 
Sony Ericsson 6.1 4.4 
Others 18.8  18.9 
Number of subscribers 1882  90 
  
 
Table 4: Average Signal Strength by Carrier 
 
Carrier Average Strength Standard Deviation
AT&T 2.63 0.92
Sprint 2.23 1.17
T-Mobile 2.29 1.16
Verizon 2.59 0.99
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Table 5-1: Wireless Subscriptions in Pro-AT&T Markets 
(AT&T signal strength ≥ 3 and Verizon signal strength ≤ 2) 
 
 None AT&T Sprint T-Mobile Verizon Others Total (2007) 
None 261 32 1 13 14 55 276 
AT&T 15 365 6 11 24 23 444 
Sprint 4 11 101 6 13 10 145 
T-Mobile 3 14 4 143 18 15 197 
Verizon 6 27 10 10 358 12 423 
Others 27 72 18 20 38 342 517 
Total (2008) 316 521 140 203 465 457 2102 
 
Table 5-2: Wireless subscriptions in Pro-Verizon Markets 
(AT&T signal strength ≤ 2 and Verizon signal strength ≥ 3) 
 
 None AT&T Sprint T-Mobile Verizon Others Total (2007) 
None 147 12 4 5 10 42 220 
AT&T 4 193 1 3 11 19 231 
Sprint 0 5 62 4 11 4 86 
T-Mobile 2 4 1 45 3 6 61 
Verizon 6 12 2 5 231 9 265 
Others 20 28 8 8 30 310 302 
Total (2008) 179 252 78 70 296 290 1165 
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates (Basic Logit) 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Brand intercepts for handsets 
Apple 0.6030 0.1554 0.8414 0.1592
BlackBerry 0.5308 0.0900 1.064 0.0951
HTC -1.1192 0.1964 -1.0851 0.2065
LG -0.0441 0.0490 -0.0053 0.0484
Motorola -0.2429 0.0504 -0.0675 0.0509
Nokia -0.6623 0.0576 -0.6704 0.0573
Sanyo -1.8323 0.1045 -1.878 0.1056
Sony -1.8720 0.0920 -1.9486 0.0933
Palm -0.6635 0.1556 -0.7183 0.1564
Samsung -0.6371 0.0518 -0.6692 0.0514
Brand intercepts for carriers 
AT&T 1.0295 0.0562 1.0393 0.0561
Sprint -0.3363 0.0759 -0.3021 0.076
T-Mobile 0.1556 0.0726 0.0901 0.0731
Verizon 0.9628 0.0577 0.9551 0.0578
Features 
Touch screen 0.5050 0.1098 0.7178 0.1084
GPS 0.9852 0.0797 0.8913 0.0795
Smartphone  1.2960 0. 1908 1.1881 0.1822
Tech * smartphone 0.8338 0.0740 0.8286 0.0744
Contract -1.0729 0.2221 -1.1273 0.2254
Signal Strength 0.0774 0.0341 0.0926 0.0341
Price coefficients for handsets 
Income group 1 (< $40,000) -0.0146 0.0007 -0.0178 0.0008
Income group 2 ($40,000~$90,000) -0.0138 0.0006 -0.0172 0.0006
Income group 3 (> $90000) -0.0113 0.0007 -0.0149 0.0009
Price coefficients for carriers 
Income group 1 (< $40,000) -0.0757 0.0058 -0.0732 0.0058
Income group 2 ($40,000~$90,000) -0.0633 0.0057 -0.0603 0.0057
Income group 3 (> $90000) -0.0625 0.0057 -0.0593 0.0058
State dependence 
Service 2.3749 0.0315 2.3839 0.0315
Phone 0.5657 0.0339 0.5247 0.0341
Control factor 0.0090 0.0005
Log likelihood -20696 -20567 
# of observations 7526 7526 
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates (Random Coefficients Logit) 
 
Variable Estimate Std. Err.
Brand intercepts for handsets 
Apple 0.6992 0.1554
BlackBerry 0.7424 0.0974
HTC -1.4024 0.2028
LG -0.051 0.049
Motorola -0.0608 0.0516
Nokia -0.6744 0.0574
Sanyo -1.9407 0.1074
Sony -2.0212 0.095
Palm -1.605 0.1682
Samsung -0.6842 0.0517
Brand intercepts for carriers 
AT&T 1.1100 0.0641
Sprint -0.1379 0.1341
T-Mobile -0.3001 0.2274
Verizon 0.8003 0.0711
Features 
Touch screen 1.0194 0.1056
GPS 0.8027 0.0850
Smartphone  0.7694 0.1833
Tech * smartphone 0.8303 0.0765
Contract -1.3149 0.2910
Signal Strength 0.0746 0.0344
Price coefficients for handsets 
Income group 1 (< $40,000) -0.0183 0.0008
Income group 2 ($40,000~$90,000) -0.0177 0.0006
Income group 3 (> $90000) -0.0154 0.0007
Price coefficients for carrier 
Income group 1 (< $40,000) -0.0678 0.0075
Income group 2 ($40,000~$90,000) -0.0550 0.0074
Income group 3 (> $90000) -0.0543 0.0075
State dependence 
Service 2.4411 0.0328
Phone 0.5305 0.0345
Control factor 0.0092 0.0006
Covariance matrix 
σ11 0.6836 0.1820
σ12 0.0288 0.0404
σ13 0.0189 0.0602
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σ14 0.1450 0.1512
σ15 0.2643 0.0820
σ22 0.1530 0.0528
σ33 0.2157 0.1259
σ44 0.7678 0.3704
σ55 0.1935 0.0816
N 7526 
LL -20474 
 
 
Table 8: Predicted Market Shares without Price Adjustments 
 
Carrier  
iPhone for 
AT&T only AT&T+Verizon All carriers
AT&T  1.35% 1.34% 1.33%
T-Mobile 0.28%
Sprint  0.23%
Verizon 0.91% 0.90%
Others 0.74%
Total 1.35% 2.25% 3.48%
 
 
Table 9: Predicted Retail Prices and Market Shares 
 
Carrier 
iPhone for AT&T & Verizon iPhone for all carriers 
Predicted Price Market Share Predicted Price Market Share 
AT&T  $199.98 1.31% $199.13 1.31% 
T-Mobile $149.56 0.63% 
print  $145.75 0.53% 
Verizon $205.09 0.83% $205.19 0.81% 
Others $163.37 1.31% 
Total 2.14% 4.59% 
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Figure 1: Frequency Distribution of Handset Prices 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 More
Frequency
Handset Price
